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ABSTRACT 
This paper contributes to the debate on the inducement of environmental innovations by 
analysing the extent to which endogenous inducement mechanisms spur the generation of greener 
technologies in contexts characterized by weak exogenous inducement pressures. In the presence 
of a fragile environmental regulatory framework, inducement can indeed be endogenous and 
environmental innovations may be spurred by firms’ reactions to their direct or related 
environmental performance. Cross-sector analysis focuses on a panel of Italian regions, over the 
time span 2003-2007, and is conducted by implementing zero-inflated regression models for 
count data variables. The empirical results suggest that in a context characterized by a weak 
regulatory framework, such as the Italian one, environmental performance has significant and 
complementary within- and between-sector effects on the generation of green technologies. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The economic analysis of environmental issues has received increasing attention over the last 
decades. Within the wide body of literature on the subject, the dynamics of the creation of 
environmental innovations has recently become a key topic, due also to the identification of these 
new technologies as a means of restoring the competitiveness of advanced countries which has 
been harmed by the economic crisis. Their emergence is indeed supposed to bring about new jobs 
and new perspectives for economic growth. 
In this respect, an investigation of the determinants of green innovations may provide useful 
input to policymakers when designing targeted measures aiming, on the one hand, at reducing the 
environmental impact of production activities and, on the other, at fostering technology-based 
competitiveness.  
Most of the literature analysing determinants of environmental innovation has been grounded on 
the induced innovation approach according to which stringent environmental regulation may 
exert an incentive to firms to introduce innovations, for instance, allowing  the polluting 
standards exogenously set up by policymakers to be met (Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; 
Rennings and Rammer, 2011; Rennings and Rexhäuser, 2011). 
This paper aims at contributing to this strand of literature by adopting a different and yet 
complementary perspective on the inducement mechanism. We investigate the extent to which, in 
a context with a weak environmental regulatory framework, an inducement of environmental 
technologies can still be at stake. In such a framework, inducement could indeed be endogenous 
rather than exogenous. Instead of investigating the direct relationship between an inducing factor 
(mainly an environmental policy) and the generation of green technologies, as previous literature 
has done, we posit that it is important to understand if and to which extent such endogenous 
mechanisms are set in motion as a response to environmental performance. In articulating this 
hypothesis, we provide an interpretation of how those endogenous mechanisms work by 
appreciating the distinction between direct inducement and that exerted by related sectors. To 
understand the latter, we need to stress the differences and complementarities between the 
adoption of greener technologies and their generation processes. For the latter, we argue that 
inducement mechanisms are likely to work through user-producer dynamics based on the derived 
demand of polluting agents for cleaner technologies rather than through their direct innovating 
efforts. We put particular emphasis on the importance of vertical linkages and the role of derived 
demand in stimulating the generation of green technologies since environmental innovations may 
be endogenously pulled by the derived demand of vertically related sectors featuring bad 
environmental performance. To test for this, we implement a synthetic measure of vertical 
relatedness across sectors based on input-output tables. 
Cross-sectoral analysis is carried out on a panel of Italian regions observed over the time span 
2003-2007, and is based on matching of the regional National Accounting Matrix with 
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Environmental Accounts (henceforth NAMEA) data, patent data and regional economic 
accounts. The econometric results, obtained by implementing a zero-inflated binomial model for 
count data variables, identify interesting and persistent patterns of inducement for different 
classes of emissions. Environmental performance of vertically related sectors, proxied by 
emission intensities in terms of value added, exerts a positive impact on the generation of green 
technologies. This would support the hypothesis that sectors with higher levels of green 
innovativeness are stimulated to generate green knowledge by the demand coming from 
vertically related sectors with bad environmental performance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 articulates an induced innovation 
framework to the analysis of the determinants of the creation of green knowledge at the sectoral 
and regional level and constructs the working hypothesis. Section 3 outlines the empirical context 
of the analysis while Section 4 presents the data, methodology and variables. In section 5, we 
show the results of the econometric analyses and the main robustness checks we implemented. 
We provide conclusions and points for discussion in Section 6. 
2 Induced technological change and derived demand for environmental 
innovations 
 
The inducement hypothesis in climate change has been largely investigated in the domain of 
environmental economics. This hypothesis identifies environmental regulation as a driver for 
environmental innovations, resting upon the traditional Hicksian argument that “A change in the 
relative prices of factors of production is itself a spur to invention, and to invention of particular 
kind – directed to economizing the use of the factor which has become relatively expensive”1 
(Hicks, 1932: 124-125).This strand of literature points to the moderating role played by 
regulation on the generation of green technologies. A stringent policy is treated as an additional 
cost that increases total production costs by changing the relative factor prices. This induces firms 
to engage in innovation activities aimed at reducing the increased cost, e.g. by developing 
emission-saving technologies
2
. The incentives are engendered outside the production system, i.e. 
                                                          
1
Habbakuk (1962) provided support to this hypothesis showing how, in American and British historic evidence 
through the nineteenth century, labour scarcity pushed firms to generate and introduce labour-saving technologies. 
The formal analysis provided by Kennedy (1964) and Samuelson (1965) consists in the construction of an innovation 
possibility frontier, with the typical shape of a production possibility frontier, along which the trade-off between 
labour-saving and capital-saving innovations can be traced. The relative costs of capital and labour shape the 
isorevenue that enables identification of an optimum direction of technological change (Binswanger andRuttan, 
1978). The approach has been criticized for the lack of microeconomic foundations by Salter (1966), but remains one 
of the cornerstones of the economics of innovation. Ruttan (1997 and 2001) has shown that technological change is 
characterized by a strong directionality that can be represented in terms of changes in the output elasticity of 
production factors. 
2
Pindyck (1979), and Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), shed light on the question as to what extent energy and capital are 
complementary or substitutes by concluding that in the short run these are complements while in the long run they 
are substitutes. Accordingly, an increase in the price of energy (factor of production) in the long run induces 
technological change (Jaffe and Stavins, 1995). 
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in the institutional system and will for this reason be labelled as exogenous in this paper. The 
correlation between environmental regulation and technological change has been empirically 
investigated either by using patent data to test whether regulation affected knowledge generation
3
 
(e.g. Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Popp, 
2006) or by using survey data to test whether regulation pushes and/or pulls environmental 
innovations  (e.g. Frondel et al, 2008; Horbach et al., 2012, Rennings and Rammer, 2011; 
Rennings and Rexhäuser, 2011; for a review see Del Rio, 2009). In both cases, evidence confirms 
that regulation exerts a positive effect on innovation. 
 
The outcome of such inducement mechanisms cannot however be taken for granted. The public 
nature of innovation and the appropriability regime does indeed create a positive externality, 
which is translated into innovation efforts that are lower than the social optimum. Conversely, 
pollution is a case of negative externality, the social costs of which are spread over the entire 
society, so that firms pollute more than the social optimum level. Without policy intervention 
“firms pollute too much and innovate too little compared with the social optimum” and 
investments in green technologies are in the end too low as “the two market failures are mutually 
reinforcing” (Johnstone et al., 2010b: 9). The need for environmental regulation is also supported 
by the Porter Hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) in its different versions
4
, and 
empirical evidences underline the positive effect of regulation over firms’ competitiveness, e.g. in 
terms of increased trade for environmental technologies (Costantini and Mazzanti, 2012).  
 
 
 
Moreover, the regulatory push/pull framework may have different effects across different 
typologies of environmental innovations (Rennings and Rammer, 2009; Rexhäuser and Rammer, 
2013) and different policy frameworks
5
 may generate different innovative outcomes (Popp et al., 
2009). What is more, the stringency, predictability, flexibility, incidence and depth of the policy 
                                                          
3
In this perspective, an increase in pollution abatement expenditures, taken as a proxy for the stringency of 
environmental regulation, exerts a positive effect on granted patents in environmental fields (Lanjouw and Mody, 
1996) and on patent applications in environmental technologies (Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003). Conversely, by 
using the same proxy for environmental regulation, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) found a positive effect only on 
innovation inputs, measured by R&D expenditure, while no significant effect was found on overall patents.The 
literature has also focused on specific environmental patents, e.g. on the effect of climate change policies on 
renewable energy patents (Johnstone, 2010a), on some specific regulations, e.g. the Clean Air Regulation on NOx 
and Sox (Popp, 2006) and on the role of the perception of stringent environmental policies (Johnstone et al., 2012). 
In all these cases, confirmation of the inducement hypothesis has been found. 
4
 This hypothesis suggests that stringent environmental regulations, under certain circumstances, may trigger 
innovations which lead to innovation offsets that are going to improve firm competitiveness. According to the 
assumptions on the effect of regulations, the Porter Hypothesis can be split into a “narrow” a “weak” and into a 
“strong” version (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). This hypothesis remains controversial in its empirical investigation (see, 
for instance,Lanoie et al., 2011). Without going into the details of this literature, it is important for us to highlight its 
content and the fact that this idea challenges the one that regulation may be detrimental on firms’ and countries’ 
competitiveness, thus encouraging production to be moved to countries with lower environmental standards. This is 
known as pollution haven hypothesis.  
5
 Market-based instruments such as taxes on the emissions or tradable permits have indeed stronger impacts on 
innovations than direct regulation (e.g. Popp et al., 2009)  
5 
 
instruments impact on the effort and direction of the innovations (Johnstone et al., 2010b) 
although the measurement of these elements is not an easy task (Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011). 
In contexts characterized by weak environmental regulatory frameworks and/or barriers to policy 
enforcement, the inducement may come from within the economic system (endogenous) rather 
than from the institutions (exogenous).  
 
A step forward in the identification of the endogenous incentive for firms to generate green 
technologies is represented by the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR)
6
. As 
remarked by Orlitzky et al. (2011), although the CSR concept appears to be a multifaceted one, 
the assumption that environmental responsibility is a key part of it is less controversial (Hart, 
1997). Accordingly, factors such as moral appeal, sustainability and reputation are particularly 
relevant in shaping the choice of firms to adopt environment-friendly behaviour. The generation 
of green technologies may allow firms to align the target of lowering the environmental impact of 
the production process with the target of increasing technology-based competitiveness. The 
reduction of production costs becomes a potential side effect stemming from the generation of 
green technologies whereas the main inducing factor relates to the likelihood of improving firms’ 
performance through market evaluation. 
 
These positive business performance effects of firms’ environmental innovation strategies have 
been systematically assessed by Ambec and Lanoie (2008) who explicitly analysed the channels 
through which environmental practices are improving firms’ financial performance. On the one 
hand, environmental performance can increase revenues via a better access to “green” markets, 
via a product differentiation strategy and via entering a market for their pollution control 
technologies. On the other hand, it can reduce costs in the following categories: “a) risk 
management and relations with external stakeholders; b) cost of material, energy and services; c) 
cost of capital and d) cost of labour” (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008: 46).To sum up, consistently with 
the broader CSR approach, environmental responsibility may affect firms’ financial returns by 
allowing the development of new markets, the increase of the market value of publicly traded 
firms, the reduction of consumer boycotts and the attraction of active consumers
7
. Moreover, a 
proactive environmental management may also reduce the risks associated with potential 
regulatory and legal actions (Lee, 2008). 
                                                          
6
The origins of this approach date back to the 1950s and it has been developed to accommodate the traditional firms’ 
maximization objectives and the idea that corporations play a role in society (see Lee (2008) for an exhaustive 
review). In the last decades, this approach has successfully elaborated a framework that articulates the link between 
CSR and corporate financial performance (CFP) (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Porter and 
Kramer, 2002 and 2006, Kotler and Lee, 2005).The recent developments of strategic management theories draw 
upon the extension of the stakeholder theory, as proposed by Freeman (1984). Unlike traditional approaches, in this 
one, firms’ objectives should not only take into account shareholders, but also stakeholders, thus involving 
employees, local communities, governments and customers. Consequently, the social and economic goals of a 
corporation are strictly intertwined. The grafting of the CSR onto the stakeholder theory has allowed the scope of the 
concept of CSR to be widened to include environmental responsibility, diversity, affirmative action, transparent 
accounting, etc. (Jones, 1995; Clarkson, 1995; Berman et al., 1999). 
7
This makes CSR closely related to the concept of sustainable consumption (Sanne, 2002; Gilg et al., 2005). 
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The inducement hypothesis in climate change, by stressing the impact of changes in the 
regulatory framework on firms’ costs, can thus be read as an application of a price-inducement 
argument to the price of polluting production technologies (Lichtenberg, 1986; Antonelli, 1998). 
The mechanisms through which the adoption of an environmental regulation is translated into an 
increase in environmental innovations are to our knowledge still not fully explored. Indeed, it is 
worth stressing that patent statistics are a reliable proxy of inventive activity, but not of adoption, 
since polluting firms under a stringent regulation may be willing to adopt green technologies, but 
they do not always have the necessary competences to generate them. In such cases, the pressure 
from regulation can engender a derived demand of green technologies.  
 
The interplay between the classical inducement mechanism and the derived demand pull 
dynamics (Schmookler, 1957) allows the relevance of vertical linkages to be stressed (as in 
Cainelli and Mazzanti, 2013) and gives rise to an extended inducement hypothesis. Downstream 
firms confronted with stringent regulatory frameworks resort to upstream firms for the supply of 
new and more environment-friendly technologies in the production process. A stringent 
regulatory framework thus alters the relative prices of production processes, inducing firms to 
redefine the characteristics of the intermediate goods they buy on factors’ markets8. The 
interactions between users and producers therefore matter in shaping the ultimate effects of the 
inducement mechanism, in a way that the generation and the adoption of new technologies 
become strictly complementary (von Hipple, 1988; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Antonelli, 
2006; Castellacci, 2008). 
 
In view of the arguments articulated so far, we are now able to spell out our working hypothesis. 
Inducement mechanisms play a crucial role in the generation of new technological knowledge, 
especially in the domain of green technologies. The interplay between price-inducement and 
derived demand-pull mechanisms brings vertical linkages to the centre of our analysis, where the 
generation of new technologies is likely to be triggered by the derived demand of polluting firms 
for technologies that improve their environmental performance. 
 
However, the relevance of these inducement mechanisms is context-specific. In contexts 
characterized by weak regulations and ineffective policy interventions, the inducement 
mechanism is more likely to be set in motion by endogenous mechanisms, i.e. internal to the 
economic system, rather than by the exogenous ones, i.e. lying in the policy realm. In particular 
we hereby mainly consider as endogenous mechanisms the following co-occurring mechanism: 
the social responsibility of firms that are responsible for the emissions of pollutants and the 
opportunistic behaviour of pre-emptive response to a future regulation.  
 
                                                          
8
 Alternatively, one can look at the inducement mechanisms as the result of the movement of firms across the 
Lancastrian space representing the features of the intermediate goods they employ in the production process 
(Lancaster, 1966) 
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The paper raises the basic question as to what extent an inducement of environment-related 
inventing activities may also be depicted in those contexts characterized by weak (exogenous) 
policy inducements. We further draw on this intuition and test on the one hand whether, in the 
presence of weak policy inducement, some endogenous inducement mechanisms are at stake. In 
particular, we analyse on the one handwhether the generation of green technologies is directly 
affected by regional and sectoral environmental performance. On the other hand, we test whether 
vertical relationships are important in that environment-related inventing activities may benefit 
from an endogenous inducement from downstream firms operating in vertically related sectors 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous attempts have been made to investigate the 
inducement environmental region/sector composition plays on the generation on knowledge. 
 
In line with the local dimension of stakeholder theory, the hypothesis we are testing is that firms 
located in highly polluting regions and belonging to strong polluter sectors will be more prone to 
inducing the generation of green technologies in upstream sectors, as compared with others, 
either as a side-effect of their expectation of future stringent regulations or as an effect of 
increasing environmental responsibility. In other terms, we test whether sectoral environmental 
performance in the sampled regions is likely to affect sectoral generation of green technologies. 
More precisely, we hypothesize that environmental performance generated by closely (vertically) 
related sectors affects green innovative activities whereas the sectors in which the generation of 
green technologies occurs are also likely to be characterized by better environmental 
performance. 
3 Empirical context 
 
As outlined in the previous section, the strand of literature on the induced innovation hypothesis 
in climate change basically tests the existence of a link between environmental regulation and 
green technological change. We have argued that in an environmental policy weak context, it 
may not be appropriate to focus on the regulatory framework since it is more likely that only 
endogenous inducement mechanisms will be set in motion. Although Italy presents one of the 
higher levels in the amount of environmental taxes
9
, we have chosen this country as an 
environmental policy weak context for the reasons we are now going to discuss. Although Italy is 
part of a broader European environmental policy framework, country heterogeneities are still at 
stake and depend on the way policies are implemented. Any policy framework may vary 
                                                          
9
 Italy is the third country, after Germany and United Kingdom, in the level (in absolute terms) of environmental 
taxes in ranking Eurostat data on Environmental tax revenue for European countries in the last available year (2011) 
and its position in terms of GDP lies in the middle of the rank. These data include all environmental taxes in the 
following fields: Energy, Transport, Pollution and Resources (Eurostat: Environmental tax revenue). Since high 
energy prices can induce green innovations (e.g. Popp, 2001), and the presence of high energy taxes (as is the case of 
Italy) raises the costs of energy consumption, we will control for the role of energy consumption as a robustness 
check in our empirical analysis, to be sure that our assumption of weak policy is not engendering a bias in our 
estimation deriving from omission of the role of energy consumption. See estimation results in Table 7.  
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according to its characteristics such as its stringency, certainty, incidence, depth and flexibility 
(for a discussion, see Haščič et al, 2009) and what makes the difference in terms of inducement is 
not the existence of an environmental policy per se, but relative policy stringency. In this respect, 
Italy is one of the countries reporting lower levels in the indicator of policy stringency
10
 (Haščič 
et al, 2009). Furthermore, higher levels of corruption reduce the stringency of an environmental 
policy (Damania et al., 2003), and Italy is one of the European countries performing worst in 
terms of controls of corruption
11
. The country also presents lower levels in stability and 
transparency
12
 of the environmental policy compared with other OECD countries (Johnstone et 
al., 2010b). Lastly, it does not report many environmental instruments, with the exception of the 
EU ETS (“European Trading Scheme”) sectors which fall under the EU ETS Directive, and the 
relatively high level of environmental taxes we outlined before. 
When assessing the role of the policy framework in the Italian context on emission performance, 
a further confirmation of the weakness of the Italian regulation has emerged in the literature. The 
insight is that manufacturing “has also not adapted to the new climate change policy scenario, 
and even the environmental Italian policy as a whole has somewhat lagged behind other leading 
countries in terms of policy efforts”. (Marin and Mazzanti, 2013: 22). 
For these reasons, it is more likely that, in such a context, pressures - if any - to improve the 
environmental performance emerge within corporate boundaries rather than from external policy 
constraints. 
The Italian policy weak empirical context justifies our decision to select this country, in order to 
test our hypothesis on whether the environmental performance, rather than direct policy measure, 
induces green technological change, or, in other terms, whether environmental performance (both 
direct and related) is correlated with the generation of green knowledge. The focus on Italy is 
even more relevant if we look at its overall trends in air emissions. In terms of total Greenhouse 
Gases (GHG), emission is indeed still far from reaching the 2012 Kyoto target, with its overall 
GHG emissions reduced by only 3.5%
13
 (UNFCCC). Most importantly, it is the European 
                                                          
10
 The study by Haščič et al. (2009) uses data from the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey to 
assess both the level of flexibility and stringency across a set of selected countries in the period 2001-2006. For both 
indicators, which are highly correlated, Italy is performing averagely worse than the other European Countries, with 
an index of 4.95 for stringency and 3.77 for flexibility in a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7 (with 7 being the most 
stringent regime). If we think of the well known case of the Ilva steel production plant in Taranto (Italy), we can find 
an example which corroborates our assumption of weaknesses (to be fair) in the enforcement of an Italian 
environmental policy. 
11
 In ranking data of the World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators- we see that Italy reports for 2011 (the last 
year available) a value in the indicator on the control of Corruption of -0.007, which is greater only than those 
reported by Romania and Greece (for European Union countries). This index ranges from -2.5 and + 2.5 and captures 
the “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests”. For details on the construction of 
this index, refer to Kaufmann et al. (2010). 
12
 In a subsequent study, Johnstone et al. (2010b) in using the same WEF data, presented a rank of countries 
according to an index on the policy stability and transparency and Italy performs badly also in this last respect.  
13
 The target for Italy was to reach by 2012 a total Gg of Co2 equivalent in GHG equal to 92% of the emissions 
recorded in 1990. The 3.5% reduction refers to the year 2010, with 1990 as a reference year. 
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country in the G8 group that is performing worst
14
, and it has reached a reduction in GHG which 
is even lower than the European Union average
15
. 
The choice of an appropriate country-case is however not enough since an appropriate level of 
analysis has to be chosen. Intuitively, the best level of analysis would be the firm level one, but 
the lack of data availability at this level calls for an alternative solution. 
If we look at the regional composition of air emissions in Italy (Figure 1), we find evidence of 
strong and persistent regional differences which suggest the need to perform analysis at regional 
level.  
Furthermore, the economic literature on sectoral emission patterns and “delinking” with income 
growth, provides support for the need for a sector-based analysis since strong sectoral patterns 
have emerged (Marin and Mazzanti, 2013; Marin et al., 2012; Mazzanti et al., 2008; Mazzanti 
and Zoboli, 2009).This literature highlights that the degree of technological development is 
“highly differentiated by sector and geographical entity” (Mazzanti et al., 2008:296)16.  
>>> INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE <<< 
Final confirmation of the appropriateness of this focus lies in the consideration that 
heterogeneities are also expected in the way regions and sectors respond to environmental 
pressures since those differences outlined in the social capital endowments (see e.g. Helliwell and 
Putnam, 1995) may engender different sector-regional innovative reactions.  
4 Data, methodology and variables 
 
4.1 Description of data 
 
                                                          
14
Indeed, France has achieved a 6% reduction, United Kingdom, 22.5% and Germany 24.8%. These GHG emission 
reductions refer to the year 2010 compared with the emission levels in 1990.  For an overview on the changes in the 
emissions of other countries refer to UNFCCC, 2012 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/sbi/eng/31.pdf). GHG 
emissions are calculated excluding emissions/removals from land use, land-use change and forestry. When including 
them, the overall picture remains similar in the sense that Italy still shows reduction performances that are worse than 
other European countries. 
15
 Whose average reduction in 2010 compared with 2012 was equal to 15.4%. 
16
In the Italian service sectors, the previous literature on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) outlined the 
existence of an inverted N-shape relationship between environmental pressure and income per capita (Marin and 
Mazzanti, 2013; Mazzanti et al., 2008). Unlike the service sectors, Italian manufacturing industry shows strong intra-
branches heterogeneities with ceramics, paper, food and fuel manufacturing facing the worst environmental 
performance dynamics (Marin and Mazzanti, 2013). Furthermore, an “N shaped” or “U shaped” EKC mostly 
depends on the emission considered in the manufacturing sectors (Mazzanti et al., 2008).These considerations on the 
Italian sector and regional heterogeneities were behind our decision to ground our empirical analysis on a sector-
region level of analysis. 
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A limited amount of studies has exploited air emission data at sectoral and regional level of 
disaggregation.  Most of these studies draw upon a rich and unique dataset, which is only 
available at the Nuts II level -to our knowledge- for Italian Regions: the regional NAMEA
17
, 
developed by the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT). Among them, Mazzanti and Montini (2010) 
have focused on the drivers of emission efficiency, adopting structural decomposition analysis to 
disentangle the determinants of changes in the emission efficiency of selected pollutants in Lazio 
(an Italian region). Costantini et al. (2013a) have focused on the economic drivers behind the 
geographical distribution of environmental performance for all the Italian regions. Sansoni et al. 
(2010) have provided a methodological and conceptual framework on the use of a regional 
NAMEA for international comparisons. 
 
In line with this empirical literature, we employ the Italian regional NAMEA to investigate the 
impact of environmental performance on the generation of green technologies.  
 
For the empirical analysis, we merged the regional NAMEA with different data sources 
concerning the economic and technological performance of Italian Regions. We started 
exploiting patent applications, drawn from the PATSTAT database,
18
  to build the proxy for 
knowledge generation in the domain of green technologies19. It should be stressed that the main 
limitation associated with patent data in measuring technological innovation, i.e. that of 
measuring inventions instead of innovations, is in our case less relevant, since we are willing to 
understand the effect of air emission on the generation on green knowledge, irrespective of 
whether these inventions then enter the market or not. Such dataset covers patent applications of 
firms over 20 Italian Regions and all sectors (NACE Rev. 1.1, at 2-character alphabetical codes, 
as in Tab. A2). After extracting patent applications generated by Italian inventors, we assigned 
these patents to each Italian Region, on the basis of the inventor’s address, and to each sector, on 
the basis of firms’ data. In particular, the sectoral assignment required a merge with firm data, 
which were drawn from the Bureau van Dijk Orbis dataset, and merged with patents on the basis 
of the OECD HAN correspondence tables. Over the considered time-span, the matching between 
ORBIS and PATSTAT through the OECD-HAN dataset allowed approximately 37% of Italian 
patents to be assigned to sectors
20
.  
                                                          
17
 A description of the NAMEA dataset can be found in the next section. 
18
PATSTAT Version: April 2011. 
19
 The limits of patent statistics as indicators of technological activities are well known. The main drawbacks can be 
summarized in their sector-specificity, the existence of non-patentable innovations and the fact that they are not the 
only protecting tool. Moreover, the propensity to patent tends to vary over time according to the cost of patenting, 
and it is more likely to feature large firms (Pavitt, 1985; Griliches, 1990). Nevertheless, previous studies highlighted 
the usefulness of patents as measures of production of new knowledge. Such studies show that patents represent very 
reliable proxies for knowledge and innovation, as compared with analyses drawing upon surveys directly 
investigating the dynamics of process and product innovation (Acs et al., 2002). In addition to the debate on patents 
as an output rather than an input of innovation activities, empirical analyses showed that patents and R&D are 
dominated by a contemporaneous relationship, providing further support for the use of patents as a good proxy of 
technological activities (Hall et al., 1986). 
20
 We also considered alternative ways to assign patents to industrial sectors such as the application of the 
correspondence table implemented by Schmoch et al. (2003). However, the latter is undesirably exclusively focused 
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Patents were then defined as being environmental on the basis of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization “WIPO IPC green inventory”, an International Patent Classification that identifies 
patents related to the so-called “Environmentally Sound Technologies” and scatters them into 
their technology fields (Tab. A3), with the caveat that it is not the only possible classification of 
green technologies and, as with other available classifications, it presents some drawbacks 
(Costantini et al., 2013b)
21
.  
The hybrid environmental-economic accounting matrix based on NAMEA applied to Italian 
NUTS II Regions has been used to assign the level of air emissions at a sectoral levelto each 
Region 
22
.The Italian NAMEA has indeed the great advantage of allowing a coherent assignment 
of environmental pressure to economic branches. Ten greenhouse gases and air pollutants and 
three aggregated emissions by environmental impact are available in this dataset
23
.To avoid 
overlap between variables, we found it more appropriate to ground our analysis on aggregated 
emissions by environmental impacts, i.e. Greenhouse Gases (GHG), Acidifying Gases (AC) and 
Ozone Tropospheric precursors (OzTr)
24
 and on Particulate matter (PM10)
25
. Input-Output 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
on manufacturing sectors. Moreover, the correspondence is therein based on a statistical exercise while the use of the 
ORBIS dataset allows an official classification to be obtained. 
21
 Although interesting, it is out of the scope of the current work to systematically test for the differences that may 
arise from the choice of classification. We selected the WIPO IPC green inventory since it is currently a wide and 
well established classification of green technologies. The OECD has indeed also developed the OECD Indicator of 
Environmental Technologies (OECD, 2011), based on the International Patent Classification (IPC), which features 
seven environmental areas, i.e. (a) general environmental management, (b) energy generation from renewable and 
non-fossil sources, (c) combustion technologies with mitigation potential, (d) technologies specific to climate change 
mitigation, (e) technologies with potential or indirect contribution to emission mitigation, (f) emission abatement and 
fuel efficiency in transportation, and (g) energy efficiency in buildings and lighting. At the same time, the European 
Patent Office (EPO) is working on completing its own system of classification (ECLA) to assign each patent a green 
tag, depending on the environmental aim of each patent. So far, EPO allows tagging technologies for adaptation or 
mitigation to climate change (Y02), in terms of buildings (Y02B), energy (Y02E), transportation (Y02T) and 
capture, storage sequestration or disposal of GHG (Y02C). More recently, Costantini et al. (2013b) have pointed to 
the shortcomings of classification methods based on efforts to collect IPCs potentially related to green technologies 
in one place. Focusing on the biofuels sector, they show that the WIPO Green Inventory is likely to overestimate the 
number of patents to be assigned due to the fact that IPCs are not specifically designed to identify this narrow and 
very specific domain. Clinical analysis based on keyword search and validations from experts are likely to yield finer 
grained classifications. Nonetheless, due to the wide scope of our analysis which encompasses many kinds of green 
technologies, we will rely on the WIPO Green Inventory. 
22
For a detailed description of the NAMEA tables, see ISTAT (2009) and Tudini and Vetrella (2012). 
23
The following pollutants are available in the dataset but have not been included in our analysis: carbon dioxide 
(CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), nitrogen oxides (NOX), sulphur oxides (SOX), ammonia (NH3), non-
methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC), carbon monoxide (CO) and lead (Pb). 
24
GHG, ACID and OZ are built in the NAMEA tables according to a methodology requiring the conversion of the 
pollutants responsible for each phenomenon in “equivalent tons”. In the case of GHG, the conversion is based on 
their “Global Warming Potential” (GWP), i.e. the potential of global warming associated with each emission when 
compared with CO2. To compute GHG equivalent emissions, CO2, CH4 and N20 (in tons) are multiplied by their 
coefficients, 1 (CO2) ; 310 (N20) and 21 (CH4)respectively. To aggregate emissions responsible for the acidifying 
process (ACID), the “Potential Acid Equivalent” (PAE) of each emission measured in tons has been computed and is 
based on the following coefficients: 0.22 (NOx); 0.31 (SOx) and 0.059 (NH3). Ozone precursor emissions (OZ) take 
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(Supply and Use) tables provided by ISTAT have consequently been used to build indexes of 
relatedness among sectors which have been adopted to generate related emissions variables, by 
weighting direct emissions through a weighting matrix built according to the methodology 
described in the next section. Unfortunately, a panel for the regionalized NAMEA is not yet 
available since only observations for the year 2005 have been developed (while at national level, 
a wide panel for Italy already exists). Consequently, the analysis we are implementing will be a 
cross-sectional one since the core environmental variables are only available as a cross-section
26
. 
Despite this limitation, the regional NAMEA has the considerable advantage of being, to our 
knowledge, the only NAMEA at EU level now available at the Nuts II level. NAMEA and patent 
data were then merged with regional sectoral economic accounts, regional environmental 
expenditures and regional data on exporting activities provided by ISTAT. Lastly, regional 
energy consumption at sectoral level were accounted for through the deployment of TERNA 
data
27
to test for the robustness of our estimation results. Our sample consists of 24 NACE Rev 
1.1 sectors in 20 Regions, which amounts to a pool of 480 potential observations, reduced due to 
some missing variables to a sample of 456 for our estimations
28
.  
4.2 Methodology  
 
Drawing on the literature highlighted in Section 2, we have hypothesized that, besides the 
traditional exogenous inducement from policy regulation, the generation of green technologies 
may be the outcome of an endogenous inducement mechanism. Regional polluting agents in each 
sector are likely to demand technologies enabling the improvement of their environmental 
performance so as to attract new customers, meet the preferences of sustainable customers, 
improve their reputation and increase their market value. At the aggregate level, this calls for 
investigating the extent to which in each sector-region the generation of green technologies is 
triggered by the environmental performance of vertically related sectors. We also control for the 
impact of environmental performance within the same sector. 
The literature dealing with empirical analysis of regional innovation performance is mostly based 
on the implementation of the so-called knowledge production (KPF) approach. The knowledge 
production function is one of the pillars of the applied economics of innovation (Griliches 1979, 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
into consideration “tons of potential tropospheric ozone generation”, and are computed through the following 
coefficients multiplied by the related emission: 0.014(CH4); 1.22 (NOx); 1 (NMVOC) and 0.11 (CO). 
25
 PM10 has been included although it is not an aggregation of other emissions, since on the one hand, it was not 
included in GHG or in ACID or OZ and, on the other, it is strictly connected to production. 
26
We thank two anonymous referees for suggesting a cross-section analysis rather than a panel one which was our 
first choice. 
27
 The company TERNA S.p.A. annually publishes "Statistical Data on Electricity in Italy" in which it collects data 
on the principal aspects of the national electricity sector, among which we extracted data on energy consumption by 
Sector and Region. 
28
 Sector P (Activities of households) is not covered by NAMEA data and Sector B (Fishing) presents some missing 
data for six nuts2 Regions :ITC1; ITC2; ITC4; ITI2; ITF5 and ITH1-ITH2 (Trentino Alto Adige).. 
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1990, 1992; Romer, 1990; Link and Siegel, 2007) and it has been widely applied in a variety of 
contexts including firms, regions, industries and countries
29
.  
In order to investigate the impact of pollutant emissions on the regional generation of green 
technologies across different sectors, we therefore propose an extended knowledge generation 
function in which the number of green technologies (GT) is the dependent variable. The discrete 
nature and non-negative nature of the dependent variable suggests the adoption of estimation 
techniques for count data models. 
Out of these models, the equality between conditional variance and conditional mean in the 
distribution of the dependent variable was violated, suggesting the need for a Negative Binomial 
class of models instead of a Poisson.  
Analysis of the determinants of the generation of GTs in our case poses an additional problem 
which is due to the excess sector-region combination for which we observe no GTs. This leads to 
a situation in which we observe an “excess of zeros” in the dependent variable, and investigation 
is needed to establish whether the observed zeros are due to the overall absence of patenting 
activity or to a specific lack of green patents in sector-region nonetheless featuring some degree 
of technological activity. For this specificity, we find the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) 
model is more appropriate to fit our data since it allows empirical frameworks to be modelled in 
which the excess of zeros in the dependent variable is generated by a different process than count 
values. This model simultaneously runs two equations: a binary logistical equation to model the 
zeros in the dependent variable and a proper count data estimation (negative binomial or Poisson) 
to model the count data dependent variable. In our specification, the LOGIT equation allows us to 
discriminate between the zeros due to Regions and sectors generating some patents, but no green 
patents, and those due to Regions that are not creating any kind of knowledge, green or 
otherwise. In other words, we based our inflation equation (LOGIT part of the model) on a 
variable (patid) that captures the count of the overall patents (irrespective of whether these 
patents were Environmental Technologies or not) in each region-sector combination. The Voung 
test confirmed the appropriateness of our choice, as reported in the estimation results tables. 
To test our hypothesis, the following basic model is specified: 
 GTij =β0+β1 EMij + β2 𝑊𝑗 ,𝑙≠𝑗𝐸𝑀𝑖 ,𝑙≠𝑗  + β3 PURDi + β4 POLi + β5 VAij     (1) 
+ β
6
 DENSITYi +β7 EXPORT_UEi +  β8 DIRTYi + 𝑖 +εij 
                                                          
29
 In this approach, innovations, usually measured by proxies such as R&D expenses, patents and innovation counts 
enter the production function either directly, next to capital and labour, or indirectly, through a two-step procedure in 
a model that estimates its effects on the general efficiency of the same production function. In this context, the KPF 
is indeed what Griliches (1979) used to label “extended production function” (Krafft and Quatraro, 2011). In order to 
mark the difference with this approach, we will follow Antonelli and Colombelli (2013) and use the expression 
“knowledge generation function” which studies the direct relations between inputs that make generation of 
knowledge as an output possible. 
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where i = 1,…, 20 indicates the Region j =1, … , 24 stands for the Sector and β0 to β8 the 
coefficients to be estimated. The error term is decomposed so as to account for region (i), fixed 
effects. The region (i), fixed effect is accounted for with the inclusion of 4 locational 
dichotomous variables: NORTHEAST, NORTHWEST, SOUTH and CENTER (benchmark).  
In a second step (Equation 2), we add a variable to the model to account for the presence of 
metropolitan areas in the Region (METRO): 
 GTij =β0+β1 EMij + β2 𝑊𝑗 ,𝑙≠𝑗𝐸𝑀𝑖 ,𝑙≠𝑗  + β3 PURDi + β4 POLi + β5 VAij     (2) 
+ β
6
 DENSITYi +β7 EXPORT_UEi +  β8 DIRTYi + β9 METROi + 𝑖 +εij 
The variables included in equation (1) to (2) are described in the following section. 
 
4.3 Variables 
 
The dependent variable, green technologies (GT), is measured by the count of patent applications 
in “Environmentally Sound” technology fields in the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
The explanatory variables are all lagged to previous year to overcome endogeneity problems that 
may arise. The key variables to assess our hypotheses are the environmental ones which consist 
of a first group of direct emission efficiency (EMij) and of a second one of related emission 
efficiency (Wjl*EMil≠j). EMijmeasures the emission efficiency of the Region iand Sector j in terms 
of the value added of iand j. It is built according to the following specification:  
 
EMij = log  
EMISSIONS  ij 2005
VA ij 2005
          (3) 
EMISSIONS is a vector of four emission variables (GHG, AC, PM10 and OzTr as in Table 1), 
each of them available at the regional and sectoral level for the year 2005 from the ISTAT 
regionalized NAMEA dataset. 
It is worth stressing that previous contributes have used emission intensity measures to account 
for the stringency of regulation when the absence of specific data on regulation required the use 
of an approximation (e.g. Fredrikkson and Vollebergh, 2009; Costantini and Crespi, 2008). 
Fredrikkson and Vollebergh (2009), more precisely, constructed the dependent variable “Energy 
Intensity” as the physical energy units per unit of value added, with the aim of measuring the 
effects of environmental as well as energy policies. Costantini and Crespi (2008) instead, adopted 
the level of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP to measure environmental stringency of the 
importing and exporting countries. Such an indicator however, due to the way it is built, i.e. as a 
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ratio between environmental pressure and economic performance of the Region and Sector, can 
also capture some structural sector features (e.g. Cainelli, Mazzanti, Zoboli, 2010). 
Similarly, Wjl*EMil≠j measures the emission efficiency of the vertically related sectors and 
follows the following specification:  
Wj,l≠jEMi,l≠j = log 
 Wj,l≠j∗EMISSIONi,l≠j,2005l≠j
VAij2005
        (4) 
In this case, EMISSIONS are weighted according to the sectoral relatedness, by using a weighting 
matrix which gives higher values to the emissions generated by strongly related sectors. The 
matrix of sectoral relatedness has been built according to a methodology that draws upon the 
exploitation of input-output data (Essletzbichler, 2013; Fan and Lang, 2000; Feser, 2003).We 
used, as anticipated, the Italian Input Output “Supply” and “Use”, which contain  the flows and 
value of commodities produced by each industry and the flows and value of commodities 
consumed by each industry respectively, and constructed a matrix for the input-output relatedness 
between industries that follows this formulation: 
Wj,l =
1
2
 
Fj ,l
 Fj ,l
𝑛
𝑗=1
+
Fl ,j
 Fl ,j
𝑚
𝑙=1
          (5) 
where Fj,l and Fl,jmeasure the flows between industry l and j, and have been built by multiplying 
the matrix of the share of one unit of the commodity c produced by industry l by the value of c 
consumed by industry j and vice versa.    
To control for the role of economic and technology characteristics in the generation of GTs, we 
included the real value added (VA), the share of public R&D (PURD) over the total R&D and the 
effect of export oriented activities (EXPORT_UE) in the regression, all taken at average values 
2003-2005 and log-transformed
30
. 
To avoid a possible bias arising from the omission of policy variables, the ISTAT data have been 
used to build the variable POL, given by the natural logarithm of the ratio between average 
regional expenditure for environmental protection (only capital expenditure) in 2004-2005 of 
Region i and VA in 2004-2005
31
 (as in Costantini and Crespi, 2008). To interpret the industry 
effect better, we included a dichotomous variable, DIRTY, equal to 1 for the most polluting 
sectors and zero otherwise in the model (see Table 1 for details). Lastly, we controlled for the 
density of the Region, DENSITY, measured as the ratio between the Population and the Area.  
                                                          
30
 In a way, export also accounts for the possible role that foreign countries regulations exert on local production, in 
the case of foreign environmental standards over imported goods, either for consumption or intermediate goods. As a 
robustness check, we also tested an alternative variable which refers to all exporting activities without restrictions on 
the European market. Results have proved to be robust and are available upon request.  
31
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we should build this variable on capital expenditure only 
instead of using total expenditure, which also includes current expenditure such as those for wages. As a robustness 
check we alternatively constructed this variable by using the total regional expenditure for environmental protection 
and also the total regional expenditure on environmental R&D (separately). Results remained unaltered and are 
available upon request.  
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In equation (2) we added a dichotomous variable to our model, METRO, taking value 1 for those 
Regions in which a metropolitan area is present
32
 since the literature on agglomeration economies 
suggests that this is where knowledge capabilities are highly concentrated.
33
 
Table 1 provides a synthesis of the definition of the variables used in the analysis. 
>>> INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE <<< 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in Table 2. It is worth stressing that the 
statistics concerning the dependent variable highlight a strongly over-dispersed distribution in 
which the variance is far higher than the mean, suggesting the appropriateness of a Negative 
Binomial class of models.  
>>>INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE <<< 
Table 3 shows the sectoral distribution of green technologies. In Italy, over the observed period, 
the bulk of the GT generation is clustered in the manufacturing sector, as could be expected. In 
particular, about 41% of the GTs are produced in the sector dealing with the manufacturing of 
equipment. This suggests that much of them are embodied in intermediate capital goods. The real 
estate sector also deserves to be mentioned since therein it produces about 15% of the observed 
green patents. 
>>> INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE <<< 
In Table 3 we also report the sectoral distribution of air emissions related to the sectoral value 
added. The worst environmental impact for GHG comes from the electricity, gas and water 
supply sector which is also responsible for high levels of OzTr emissions. This is the reason why 
in the robustness checks we excluded this sector from the regression to test for the stability of our 
results. Fishing sector and the manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products are responsible for 
the highest amount of relative pollution of OzTr, while the Agriculture sector shows the worst 
relative performance for AC emissions and also relative bad performance in terms of PM10. 
Intuitively, the transport sector is also responsible for high values, and if we look at the absolute 
value of equivalent tons (instead of the relative ones), it is the worst performing sector in terms of 
OzTr and presents high values on all the other pollutants. 
Lastly, in Table 4 we show the Spearman Rank correlation coefficients which account for 
extreme values in the considered variables. 
                                                          
32
 In particular, we considered those developed around the 4 cities of Milan, Rome, Turin and Naplesas metropolitan 
areas. When applying a less restrictive definition of metropolitan area that also includes Palermo and Florence, 
results remained unaltered and are available upon request. 
33
 We also tested whether the use of more accurate measurement of knowledge capabilities than the METRO variable 
would have made a difference. We tested in particular for the role of Knowledge Variety, Knowledge Coherence and 
Knowledge Diversity (following the methodology proposed by Quatraro, 2010). Since these results did not provide 
better insights but just confirmed the robustness of our already existing ones, for the sake of parsimony, we have 
omitted these variables from the analysis.  
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>>> INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE <<< 
As is clear from this table, emission intensity variables are highly correlated. Their joint inclusion 
in the regressions is therefore likely to engender biased estimations. For this reason, we will carry 
out separate estimations for each of the considered emissions. 
In the next section, we present and discuss the results of the econometric estimations. 
5 Econometric results 
 
Table 5 reports the results for the zero inflated negative binomial regressions of the equation (1), 
which includes total patents in the inflation part of the model.  In this table we report the baseline 
model.  
As far as the control variables are concerned, only value added and R&D are statistically 
significant and feature a positive coefficient. The key variables of this study are however those 
concerning sectoral environmental performance at the regional level. 
>>> INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE <<< 
The main hypothesis underlying our empirical investigation is that environmental performance 
may trigger the generation of environmental technologies, working as an endogenous inducement 
factor. We also stress that inducement mechanisms are likely to work through the derived 
demand of downstream polluting firms for green technologies produced in upstream vertically 
related sectors. It is worth recalling that the relatedness matrix we have used to weight the impact 
of emissions of sectors l≠j on sector j is based on the input-output matrix. In other words, we 
measure the effects on sector j of the emissions produced by technically related sectors. Technical 
proximity therefore allows the effects of environmental performance of related sectors to be 
appreciated. 
The first column in Table 5 reports the results concerning greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
While the direct emissions are not significant, the emissions generated by vertically related 
sectors show a positive and significant coefficient. This provides initial support to the hypothesis 
that inducement mechanisms work thorough the transmission of incentives along the value chain. 
The evidence that the environmental performance of vertically related firms positively impacts 
the generation of green knowledge represents an aggregate result which is compatible with a 
microeconomic framework in which firms are increasingly aware of their environmental 
responsibility or at least of the economic benefits that may derive from their movements towards 
greener production. This holds either when those benefits come for the reason outlined in the 
literature on the CSR or when they are the consequence of a proactive response to future stringent 
regulations. Polluting firms therefore choose to commit resources to feed their demand for green 
technologies. 
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In the second column we show the coefficients of the PM10 emissions. Here too, emissions 
generated in vertically related sectors exert a positive and significant impact on the generation of 
green technologies. Conversely, the coefficient on direct emissions is negative and significant, 
suggesting the existence of a negative correlation between bad environmental performance and 
being a producer of green technologies. 
The results presented in column (3) concerning the Tropospheric Ozone precursors (OzTr) and in 
column (4) for acidifying gases (AC) are in line with the previous ones. The coefficient of 
emission intensities from related sectors is positive and significant whereas the one for direct 
emissions is negative and significant.  
Overall,the patterns that emerge from these empirical results suggest the existence of 
complementarity between direct and related effects of sectoral emission intensities. The positive 
sign of the emission intensities of vertically related sectors supports the hypothesis of an 
endogeneous inducement channelled by the downstream firms’ derived demand for green 
technologies produced in upstream sectors. The interpretation of such a pattern is compatible 
with a CSR framework in which firms try to improve their environmental performance by 
searching for green technologies in the markets for intermediate goods. On the contrary, firms 
producing and supplying green technologies are more likely to be characterized on average by 
better environmental performance so that the sign of direct emission intensities is actually 
negative and, in most cases, significant. 
 
5.1 Robustness checks 
 
Several robustness checks have been implemented to support the econometric results we 
presented above. 
First of all, in Table 6 we include a dichotomous variable, METRO, to account for the presence of 
metropolitan areas in the sampled regions. In Table 7 we control for the role of energy 
consumption of each region-sector combination, both in terms of direct (ENERGY) and related 
(W*ENERGY)
34
 consumption . The results are very consistent with the estimates presented in the 
previous section. Emissions from vertically related sectors are all featured by positive and 
significant coefficients, supporting the hypothesis of an inducement mechanism moderated by the 
derived demand of polluting downstream firms and all direct emission intensities but GHG 
emissions are featured by negative and significant coefficients.  
                                                          
34
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this further check. Data are extracted from the TERNA database. 
ENERGY is constructed as the ratio between average energy consumption in 2003-2005 and the average value added 
in 2003-2005 for each Region-Sector combination. W*ENERGY applies the weighting matrix described in Equation 
(5) to ENERGY. Since not all the sectors are covered by the TERNA database, the number of observations is reduced 
to 400.  
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>>> INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE <<< 
Secondly, we tested the robustness of the results on the related emissions by adopting a different 
specification of the fully specified weighting matrix used in Table 5 and shown in Equation 5. 
We worked on the consideration that this matrix can be thought of as a proxy for technical 
proximity amongst sectors. Accordingly, a cutoff value can be identified that discriminates close 
from far sectors. The choice of this threshold is necessarily arbitrary and we grounded our choice  
on the distribution of the weights in the matrix. Table 8 reports the results of the estimations 
obtained by using the value of Wlj at the 75
th
 percentile as cutoff. 
>>> INSERT TABLE  8 ABOUT HERE <<< 
Columns (1)-(4) show the results for the baseline estimations, whereas in columns (5)-(8) we 
control for  energy consumption. As is clear from the table, results are well in line with those 
described so far of positive and significant coefficients for the emission intensities of vertically 
related and negative and significant coefficients for all the direct emission intensities, but GHG. 
While the inducement mechanisms are channelled by the vertical transmission through the value 
chain, the sectors responsible for the generation of green technologies are confirmed to be 
characterized by virtuous environmental performance. 
We then found it appropriate to group the emission variables into two factors, resulting from 
principal component analysis. The first factor represents the direct emissions while the second 
factor refers to the emission intensities of vertically related sectors. 
>>> INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE <<< 
The first three columns in Table 9 report the results of the estimation yield by using the fully 
specified relatedness matrix whereas columns (4) and (5) show the results obtained by adopting 
the cutoff value Wlj at the 75
th
 percentile. This evidence is consistent with the results of previous 
estimations and confirms that, even when emission intensities are grouped together in a single 
factor, those of vertically related sectors feature a positive and significant coefficient whereas the 
relationship between the production of green technologies and environmental performance is 
negative and significant.  
Our results are confirmed when the Energy sector is excluded from the analysis and also once we 
controlled for the regional share of manufacturing firms, either in terms of employees or in terms 
of value added
35
. Lastly, we provide in Table A1 the results obtained by running standard 
Poisson and Negative Binomial estimations, which are well in line with the zero-inflated models 
presented in Table 5.  
 
                                                          
35
 These results are not reported here but are available upon request. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
The investigation of the determinants of the introduction of environmental innovations has gained 
momentum in recent years due to the important role that has been attributed to green technologies 
as a means of coping with economic crisis and simultaneously restoring the competitiveness of 
countries. In this debate, attention has been largely focused on the shaping role of constraining 
environmental regulatory frameworks as a mechanism for inducing the generation of green 
technologies. 
The contribution of this paper to this stream of analysis is twofold. First, we propose a 
complementary framework to the standard inducement argument in climate change that 
acknowledges that some endogenous mechanism are at stake in the presence of a weak 
exogenous policy framework. We focused on Italian regions because they have been described as 
a context characterized by a substantial lack of stringent regulation in terms of environmental 
policy. Moreover, the evolution of the industrial structure in Italy has been marked by a large  
prevalence of small and medium sized firms characterized by thick vertical linkages in which 
user-producer linkages have often been the source of innovation generated in upstream sectors 
and adopted by downstream firms (Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei, 2011).  
We then qualify the mechanisms through which inducement mechanisms may be working,  
stressing that polluting firms pushed to adopt green technologies in their production processes 
may not possess the necessary competences to generate them. The dynamics by which an 
inducement on polluting firms displays its effects passes through the user-producer relationships, 
i.e. those established between polluting firms operating downstream and those firms generating 
green technologies operating upstream. These vertical linkages along the value chain are 
confirmed as being important in this endogenous inducement framework: increases in the derived 
demand engendered by the inducing factor trigger the production of green technologies by 
supplier firms. The underlying explanation is that regional polluting agents, when not 
exogenously pushed by an environmental policy, choose or are induced to commit resources to 
technologies enabling the improvement of environmental performance, as an effect of the two 
main co-occurring mechanisms of an increased social and environmental responsibility, and an 
opportunistic pre-emptive reaction to future regulations. This translates into an increase of the 
derived demand which triggers the production of GTs in vertically related sectors. 
 
These results are obtained by applying zero-inflated negative binomial techniques and confirm an 
interesting pattern of relationships between environmental performance and the generation of 
GTs. We could indeed discriminate between direct and related effects by implementing a 
relatedness matrix across sectors based on input-output matrices and find evidence of 
complementarity between direct and related effects. The generation of GTs appears to be 
stimulated by vertically related sectors, providing support for the idea that user-producers 
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interactions are shaping the ultimate effects of the inducement mechanisms on the generation of 
new technologies. Direct sectoral emission intensities, on the other hand, appear to be negatively 
related to the generation of GTs, suggesting that the sectors producing environment-friendly 
technologies on average feature virtuous environmental performance. 
It is fair to note that our results do not imply by any means that a regulatory framework is not 
important. They rather suggest that stringent regulation is not the only force behind the choice to 
commit resources to the production of GTs and that the other way round an inducement 
mechanism may also be depicted in a policy weak context. Analysis of the endogenous 
inducement of green technologies leads to some policy measures insights which should 
complement the regulatory framework set. The importance of firms’ awareness of the social and 
environmental impact of their actions calls for the implementation of entrepreneurship policies 
devoted to developing an entrepreneurial culture that attributes increasing importance to the 
environmental performance of firms. Entrepreneurs’ awareness of the economic importance of 
their environmental performance may lead them to commit resources to R&D spending targeted 
at the generation of green technologies and identify new business opportunities to be exploited by 
spinoffs or startups. Entrepreneurship policies could therefore benefit when traditional measures 
dealing with competition, the protection of property rights and the regulation of product and 
factor markets are complemented by adding measures to shape the entrepreneurial culture 
(Audretsch et al., 2007).  
Our results call for further analyses at micro-level, to investigate the extent to which firms are 
stimulated to adopt GTs by the prospective gains in terms of reputation, and hence increase sales, 
or stock market value. Another future strand of possible research is to focus on the effect of 
environmental performance on the adoption - instead of the generation - of green technologies, by 
using for instance survey data
36
. Furthermore, a possible extension could be to attribute a role not 
only to direct environmental performance and to inter-sectoral relatedness, as we have done, but 
also to regional geographical proximity since the existence of technological and environmental 
spillovers has been depicted in the literature (Costantini et al. 2013a). Lastly, in future research it 
might be worth assessing the relationship between regulatory frameworks and environmental 
performance, treating environmental performance no longer as an explanatory variable, but, on 
the contrary, as a dependent variable. 
                                                          
36
We could not use survey data, such as the Italian Community Innovation Survey data, to assign the level of adopted 
green technologies to each Region since Italian data dissemination rules do not provide researchers with information 
on the Region of firm respondents. On the other hand, Italy is the only European country to have developed a 
NAMEA dataset at the regional level. This future line of research is not feasible as long as either other countries 
implement a regional NAMEA or the Italian Statistical Office releases innovation output data with regional 
information. 
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Figure 1 – Regional distribution of air emissions (weighted by regional value added at 2005) 
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Table 1 - Description of variables used in analysis 
Variable Description Source Year 
GT Cumulative count of green technologies in Region i and Sector j in the years 2005 to 2007 PATSTAT-REGPAT- ORBIS- 
IPCC Green Inventory 
2005-2007 
AC Emission intensity of Acidifying Gases (mainly NOx, SOx and NH3), given by the natural logarithm of the ratio between AC and the 
real value added of Region i, Sector j  
ISTAT: regional NAMEA 2005 
DENSITY Given by the ratio of mean population in the Region i on the area of i in 2003-2005 ISTAT 2003-2005 
DIRTY Dummy equal to one for the most polluting sectors. In the NACE Revision 1.1 respectively : A, DF, DG, DI, E, I.  2005 
ENERGY Natural Logarithm of the ratio between mean Energy Consumption of Sector j in 2003-2005 and its mean value added in 2003-2005 TERNA 2003-2005 
EXPORT_UE Natural Logarithm of the ratio between average Export (within European Union) 2003-2005 and meanvalue added 2003-2005. ISTAT 2003-2005 
GHG Emission intensity of Greenhouse Gases (mainly CO2, CH4 and N2O), given by the natural logarithm of the ratio between GHG  real 
value added of Region i, Sector j  
ISTAT: regional NAMEA  2005 
METRO Dummy equal to one for Regions to which belong one of the following metropolitan areas: Milano, Roma, Torino, Napoli 2005 
NORTHWES
T; 
NORTHEAST
; CENTER; 
SOUTH 
Location dummy variables for NorthernEastern-NorthernWestern-Central-Southern Regions.   2005 
OzTr Emission intensity of Tropospheric ozone precursors (mainly caused by NOx, COVNM, CO, CH4) given by the natural logarithm of 
the ratio between OzTr  real value added of Region i, Sector j 
ISTAT: regional NAMEA 2005 
PM10 Emission intensity of PM10 (Particulates< 10µm), given by the natural logarithm of the ratio between GHG and the lagged real value 
added of Region i, Sector j, in t-1 
ISTAT: regional NAMEA 2005 
POL Natural Logarithm of the ratio between average expenditure for environmental protection (only capital expenditure) in 2004-2005 of 
Region i and the mean value added of Region i in 2004-2005. 
ISTAT 2004-2005 
PURD Given by the natural logarithm of the ratio between real mean Public R&D and mean Total R&D (Business R&D + Public R&D+ 
Universities R&D) in 2003-2005 
ISTAT 2003-2005 
VA Natural Logarithm of the mean real value added of Region i, Sector j 2003-2005 ISTAT 2003-2005 
W*AC Emission intensity of AC in 2005 from vertically integrated sectors ISTAT: Regional NAMEA and 
Input-Output Tables 
2005 
W*ENERGY Mean Energy Consumption  of vertically integrated sectors on mean value edded in 2003-2005 TERNA & ISTAT: Input Output 
Tables 
2003-2005 
W*GHG Emission intensity of GHG in 2005 from vertically integrated sectors ISTAT: Regional NAMEA and 
Input-Output Tables 
2005 
W*OzTr Emission intensity of OzTr in 2005 from vertically integrated sectors ISTAT: Regional NAMEA and 
Input-Output Tables 
2005 
W*PM10 Emission intensity of PM10 in 2005 from vertically integrated sectors ISTAT: Regional NAMEA and 
Input-Output Tables 
2005 
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Table2 - Variables' Descriptive Statistics 
VAR N mean sd min max skewness kurtosis 
GT 454 1.500 7.566 0 130 12.17 190.79 
GHG 454 0.479 0.619 0.012 3.300 2.037 7.268 
W*GHG 454 0.778 0.818 0.043 4.276 1.830 6.289 
PM10 454 0.206 0.353 0.002 2.804 2.812 13.262 
W*PM10 454 0.382 0.510 0.020 3.473 2.810 13.160 
OzTr 454 1.260 0.996 0.036 5.821 1.058 4.283 
W*OzTr 454 1.621 1.119 0.268 6.239 1.343 4.819 
AC 454 0.091 0.197 0.001 1.489 3.484 16.840 
W*AC 454 0.184 0.318 0.005 2.474 3.969 23.860 
VA 454 6.639 1.783 -1.563 10.819 -0.739 3.917 
PURD 454 -1.981 0.552 -3.135 -0.674 0.281 3.506 
DENSITY 454 -1.912 0.636 -3.283 -0.857 -0.290 2.372 
DIRTY 454 0.220 0.415 0 1 1.350 2.822 
POL 454 0.091 0.091 0.011 0.311 1.196 3.152 
EXPORT_UE 454 4.433 0.812 1.839 5.249 -1.482 5.674 
NORTHWEST 454 0.196 0.397 0 1 1.531 3.345 
NORTHEAST 454 0.200 0.401 0 1 1.497 3.240 
SOUTH 454 0.352 0.478 0 1 0.618 1.382 
CENTER 454 0.403 0.491 0 1 0.395 1.156 
METRO 454 0.198 0.399 0 1 1.514 3.292 
ENERGY 400 0.097 1.016 0.000 20.099 19.189 377.969 
W*ENERGY 400 0.118 1.364 0.000 27.081 19.409 384.021 
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Table 3 - Sectoral Distribution of Green Technologies and Emissions (on value added) 
Sector (Nace Rev 1.1) GHG OzTr AC PM10 GT Freq(GT) 
A 1.643 7.391 0.883 1.538 4 1% 
B 1.361 25.880 0.396 1.951 3 0% 
C 0.465 2.090 0.030 0.115 37 5% 
DA 0.487 2.698 0.023 0.062 0 0% 
DB 0.477 0.924 0.021 0.048 9 1% 
DC 0.180 7.194 0.009 0.026 2 0% 
DD, DH, DN 0.201 3.250 0.011 0.032 56 8% 
DE 0.522 1.992 0.009 0.026 1 0% 
DF, DG 3.067 9.699 0.317 0.264 62 9% 
DI 4.039 11.119 0.315 1.475 5 1% 
DJ 0.611 3.613 0.039 0.509 29 4% 
DK, DL, DM 0.145 0.954 0.007 0.017 282 41% 
E 6.157 6.591 0.250 0.223 21 3% 
F 0.064 1.408 0.007 0.080 12 2% 
G 0.140 1.064 0.014 0.064 18 3% 
H 0.072 0.390 0.006 0.023 0 0% 
I 0.453 4.055 0.085 0.257 8 1% 
J 0.019 0.109 0.002 0.007 17 2% 
K 0.031 0.201 0.003 0.014 102 15% 
L 0.045 0.473 0.006 0.028 3 0% 
M 0.018 0.059 0.001 0.003 0 0% 
N 0.047 0.125 0.002 0.006 0 0% 
O 0.773 1.927 0.032 0.046 10 1% 
P missing missing missing missing 0 0% 
 
Table 4 - Spearman’sRankCorrelationcoefficient 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 GT 1           
2 GHG -0.0282 1          
3 PM10 -0.0988* 0.6944* 1         
4 OzTr -0.0534 0.843* 0.7287* 1        
5 AC -0.0706 0.9094* 0.8583* 0.8192* 1       
6 ENERGY -0.2871* 0.4379* 0.257* 0.4359* 0.3461* 1      
7 VA 0.3095* -0.4117* -0.2493* -0.424* -0.3236* -0.995* 1     
8 PURD -0.1272* 0.0561 0.0646 0.0625 0.0619 0.1957* -0.1965* 1    
9 DENSITY 0.2508* -0.0907 -0.0948 -0.0459 -0.0963 -0.5366* 0.5398* -0.1798* 1   
10 POL -0.3007* 0.0704 0.1208* 0.0911 0.1208* 0.4456* -0.4471* 0.3189* -0.609* 1  
11 EXPORT_UE 0.2602* -0.0005 -0.0819 -0.0828 -0.0524 -0.2216* 0.2214* -0.5155* -0.0541 -0.4496* 1 
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Table 5 - EconometricResults (I) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
     
GHG -0.5715    
 (0.3841)    
W*GHG 1.1484***    
 (0.4087)    
PM10  -1.8422***   
  (0.6615)   
W*PM10  1.4823*   
  (0.8130)   
OzTr   -0.6823**  
   (0.3340)  
W*OzTr   1.1372***  
   (0.3950)  
AC    -2.1572* 
    (1.2424) 
W*AC    2.8542** 
    (1.4255) 
VA 0.6525*** 0.4763** 0.6804*** 0.5391*** 
 (0.1907) (0.1928) (0.2441) (0.1830) 
PURD 0.6547* 0.6978* 0.6061 0.7217* 
 (0.3898) (0.3951) (0.3818) (0.4037) 
DENSITY -0.0812 0.3114 -0.1060 0.1780 
 (0.5976) (0.5952) (0.6182) (0.6153) 
DIRTY 0.1230 0.0658 0.1067 0.0367 
 (0.4672) (0.3414) (0.4179) (0.3840) 
POL -3.6634 -2.2849 -3.6687 -3.2615 
 (4.1181) (4.2125) (4.1062) (4.4774) 
EXPORT_UE 0.5729 0.6247 0.5480 0.5551 
 (0.4530) (0.4526) (0.4470) (0.4560) 
NORTHWEST 0.8026 0.5623 0.8366 0.6773 
 (0.5340) (0.5478) (0.5278) (0.5593) 
NORTHEAST -0.1791 -0.3045 -0.0918 -0.3130 
 (0.4487) (0.4470) (0.4454) (0.4524) 
SOUTH -0.7283 -0.7170 -0.8506 -0.6439 
 (0.6338) (0.6522) (0.6344) (0.6378) 
_cons -5.3711** -3.1241 -5.9275** -3.5039 
 (2.3147) (2.1622) (2.8804) (2.1403) 
inflate     
patid -0.1138*** -0.1132*** -0.1087*** -0.1134*** 
 (0.0438) (0.0409) (0.0384) (0.0422) 
_cons 1.9077*** 1.9705*** 1.9013*** 1.9552*** 
 (0.2595) (0.2521) (0.2582) (0.2539) 
lnalpha     
_cons 0.1875 0.1151 0.1462 0.1833 
 (0.2847) (0.2818) (0.2788) (0.2817) 
N 454 454 454 454 
Log-Likelihood -359.376 -359.162 -359.069 -360.887 
Pr>LR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Likelihood-ratio test α=0 (Chi²) 530.38 510.41 523.63 539.74 
Pr>Chi² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Vuong Test (z) 4.73 4.93 4.47 5.03 
Pr> z 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mc Fadden’sR2 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.201 
AIC 748.7513 748.3243 748.1389 751.7745 
BIC 810.5228 810.0957 809.9104 813.5459 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 - EconometricResults (II) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
     
GHG -0.6016    
 (0.3792)    
W*GHG 1.2563***    
 (0.4070)    
PM10  -2.0648***   
  (0.6667)   
W*PM10  1.7543**   
  (0.8023)   
OzTr   -0.8263**  
   (0.3327)  
W*OzTr   1.3378***  
   (0.3986)  
AC    -2.3252* 
    (1.2269) 
W*AC    3.0559** 
    (1.3960) 
METRO -0.6075 -0.6800 -0.8019* -0.4840 
 (0.4294) (0.4269) (0.4293) (0.4255) 
VA 0.7315*** 0.5649*** 0.7967*** 0.5880*** 
 (0.1946) (0.1939) (0.2468) (0.1825) 
PURD 0.7164* 0.7735* 0.6663* 0.7712* 
 (0.3904) (0.3948) (0.3811) (0.4037) 
DENSITY 0.1633 0.5727 0.1848 0.3887 
 (0.5967) (0.5806) (0.6045) (0.6142) 
DIRTY 0.2580 0.2095 0.3420 0.1454 
 (0.4741) (0.3451) (0.4235) (0.3906) 
POL -2.0263 -0.4677 -1.5390 -1.9045 
 (4.2152) (4.2716) (4.1957) (4.5460) 
EXPORT_UE 0.7255 0.7932* 0.7477 0.6741 
 (0.4714) (0.4691) (0.4676) (0.4719) 
NORTHWEST 0.8417 0.5720 0.8822 0.6914 
 (0.5457) (0.5623) (0.5402) (0.5715) 
NORTHEAST -0.5462 -0.7555 -0.5683 -0.6338 
 (0.5297) (0.5468) (0.5288) (0.5469) 
SOUTH -0.9681 -1.0408 -1.2133* -0.8585 
 (0.6572) (0.6879) (0.6694) (0.6684) 
_cons -5.9593** -3.7215* -6.9295** -3.7802* 
 (2.3484) (2.1584) (2.9147) (2.1293) 
inflate     
patid -0.1069*** -0.1070*** -0.1012*** -0.1089*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0336) (0.0291) (0.0367) 
_cons 1.8991*** 1.9612*** 1.8926*** 1.9502*** 
 (0.2517) (0.2448) (0.2483) (0.2492) 
lnalpha     
_cons 0.1241 0.0467 0.0540 0.1435 
 (0.2701) (0.2693) (0.2605) (0.2722) 
N 454 454 454 454 
Log-Likelihood -358.389 -357.911 -357.363 -360.244 
Pr>LR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Likelihood-ratio test  
α=0 (Chi²) 
521.31 489.00 507.92 530.32 
Pr>Chi² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Vuong Test (z) 4.75 4.99 4.51 5.04 
Pr> z 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mc Fadden’sR2 0.207 0.208 0.209 0.203 
AIC 748.7779 747.8210 746.7252 752.4885 
BIC 814.6675 813.7106 812.6147 818.3780 
Standard errors in parentheses * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
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Table 7 - Econometric Results (IV) accounting for Energy Consumption 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
     
GHG -0.6721*    
 (0.3964)    
W*GHG 1.3581***    
 (0.4545)    
PM10  -1.8818***   
  (0.6748)   
W*PM10  1.9819**   
  (1.0017)   
OzTr   -0.7282**  
   (0.3519)  
W*OzTr   1.2293***  
   (0.4190)  
AC    -2.2769* 
    (1.2752) 
W*AC    4.2012** 
    (1.8355) 
ENERGY -4.7427 2.2641 -5.3562 -5.3980 
 (36.0608) (31.7458) (29.0462) (46.8024) 
W*ENERGY -0.6266 -7.9814 0.9905 -2.8441 
 (26.9952) (24.1452) (22.6012) (33.6626) 
VA 0.5910*** 0.4636** 0.6206*** 0.4949*** 
 (0.1925) (0.1890) (0.2399) (0.1761) 
PURD 0.6626* 0.7798* 0.6088 0.8263* 
 (0.3947) (0.4042) (0.3862) (0.4226) 
DENSITY -0.0242 0.2154 -0.0517 0.1185 
 (0.5862) (0.5861) (0.6112) (0.5961) 
DIRTY 0.0544 -0.0455 0.0285 -0.1316 
 (0.4682) (0.3464) (0.4368) (0.3860) 
POL -3.2780 -2.2149 -3.2237 -3.8100 
 (4.1150) (4.1616) (4.1098) (4.4197) 
EXPORT_UE 0.7006 0.7143 0.6326 0.7220 
 (0.4681) (0.4606) (0.4559) (0.4822) 
NORTHWEST 0.8061 0.6609 0.8456 0.7821 
 (0.5331) (0.5496) (0.5314) (0.5620) 
NORTHEAST -0.1683 -0.2814 -0.0857 -0.2789 
 (0.4471) (0.4458) (0.4459) (0.4512) 
SOUTH -0.8463 -0.8350 -0.9495 -0.7463 
 (0.6337) (0.6593) (0.6390) (0.6345) 
_cons -5.3964** -3.4850 -5.7812** -3.8392* 
 (2.2935) (2.1598) (2.8410) (2.1220) 
inflate     
patid -0.0970*** -0.1011*** -0.0962*** -0.0959*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0346) (0.0310) (0.0316) 
_cons 1.6880*** 1.7621*** 1.7109*** 1.7147*** 
 (0.2657) (0.2624) (0.2640) (0.2621) 
lnalpha     
_cons 0.1362 0.0894 0.1134 0.1366 
 (0.2559) (0.2647) (0.2578) (0.2571) 
N 400 400 400 400 
Log-Likelihood -348.747 -348.578 -349.072 -349.944 
Pr>LR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Likelihood-ratio test α=0 (Chi²) 518.71 493.19 513.38 527.09 
Pr>Chi² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Vuong Test (z) 4.40 4.60 4.28 4.69 
Pr> z 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mc Fadden’sR2 0.201 0.202 0.201 0.199 
AIC 731.4940 731.1565 732.1431 733.8871 
BIC 799.3489 799.0114 799.9980 801.7420 
Standard errors in parentheses * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8 Econometric results Matrix cutoff at 75th percentile 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
         
         
GHG -0.5620    -0.6680*    
 (0.3806)    (0.3862)    
W*GHG 1.1276***    1.3603***    
 (0.3951)    (0.4462)    
PM10  -2.1162***    -2.1455***   
  (0.6637)    (0.6870)   
W*PM10  2.6448***    3.0951***   
  (0.9782)    (1.1448)   
OzTr   -0.7417**    -0.7981**  
   (0.3217)    (0.3311)  
W*OzTr   1.2613***    1.3859***  
   (0.3447)    (0.3662)  
AC    -2.4729*    -2.6568** 
    (1.2737)    (1.3056) 
W*AC    3.7941**    5.3625*** 
    (1.5944)    (1.9587) 
ENERGY     3.1483 -15.9464 -4.1860 -4.5206 
     (87.8513) (85.3080) (66.9215) (91.7332) 
W*ENERGY     -7.8736 11.2740 0.3342 0.6328 
     (96.6540) (92.3098) (73.3982) (100.2348) 
VA 0.5521*** 0.5162*** 0.6315*** 0.4973*** 0.4851*** 0.4627*** 0.5626*** 0.4549*** 
 (0.1627) (0.1615) (0.2051) (0.1497) (0.1675) (0.1640) (0.2030) (0.1547) 
PURD 0.6474* 0.7126* 0.5709 0.7290* 0.6367 0.7481* 0.5611 0.7689* 
 (0.3920) (0.3805) (0.3720) (0.3922) (0.3910) (0.3876) (0.3737) (0.3929) 
DENSITY -0.0733 0.1067 -0.1507 0.1228 0.0139 0.1075 -0.0592 0.1268 
 (0.6003) (0.5683) (0.5805) (0.5891) (0.5776) (0.5579) (0.5722) (0.5661) 
DIRTY 0.0886 0.2655 0.1811 0.1867 0.0167 0.1868 0.0995 0.0899 
 (0.4628) (0.3450) (0.4033) (0.3896) (0.4584) (0.3440) (0.4080) (0.3861) 
POL -4.1789 -3.5561 -4.3420 -3.7009 -4.0075 -3.2392 -3.9679 -4.4989 
 (4.1917) (4.1625) (3.9919) (4.3806) (4.1469) (4.1330) (3.9889) (4.3907) 
EXPORT_UE 0.5266 0.6428 0.5566 0.5928 0.6345 0.7407 0.6530 0.7277 
 (0.4531) (0.4445) (0.4399) (0.4532) (0.4597) (0.4573) (0.4471) (0.4675) 
NORTHWEST 0.9605* 0.7044 0.9065* 0.8140 0.9566* 0.7633 0.8976* 0.8813 
 (0.5520) (0.5339) (0.5171) (0.5578) (0.5382) (0.5338) (0.5170) (0.5459) 
NORTHEAST -0.0558 -0.1789 -0.0217 -0.1911 -0.0322 -0.1500 -0.0147 -0.1313 
 (0.4540) (0.4412) (0.4364) (0.4523) (0.4494) (0.4417) (0.4346) (0.4482) 
SOUTH -0.6736 -0.8284 -0.9763 -0.7211 -0.7967 -0.9267 -1.1057* -0.8266 
 (0.6365) (0.6343) (0.6206) (0.6279) (0.6296) (0.6355) (0.6228) (0.6183) 
_cons -4.2643** -3.9366* -5.5531** -3.4690* -4.1172** -3.9246* -5.3490** -3.6926* 
 (2.0516) (2.0349) (2.4937) (1.9655) (2.0226) (2.0323) (2.4469) (1.9749) 
inflate         
patid -0.1159** -0.1076*** -0.1010*** -0.1083*** -0.0963*** -0.0937*** -0.0880*** -0.0888*** 
 (0.0493) (0.0382) (0.0321) (0.0385) (0.0320) (0.0307) (0.0260) (0.0276) 
_cons 1.9086*** 1.9177*** 1.8432*** 1.9099*** 1.6727*** 1.7049*** 1.6369*** 1.6661*** 
 (0.2618) (0.2498) (0.2548) (0.2537) (0.2665) (0.2571) (0.2603) (0.2582) 
lnalpha         
_cons 0.1848 0.0567 0.0722 0.1550 0.1229 0.0251 0.0292 0.0790 
 (0.2986) (0.2816) (0.2696) (0.2758) (0.2588) (0.2626) (0.2523) (0.2547) 
N 454 454 454 454 400 400 400 400 
Log-Likelihood -358.806 -356.874 -356.315 -359.698 -347.949 -346.580 -345.942 -348.614 
Pr>LR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Likelihood-ratio test 
α=0 (Chi²) 
526.40 486.58 508.05 532.59 511.34 481.76 497.71 518.31 
Pr>Chi² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Vuong Test (z) 4.79 5.01 4.56 4.99 4.45 4.73 4.39 4.69 
Pr> z 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mc Fadden’sR2 0.206 0.210 0.211 0.204 0.203 0.206 0.208 0.202 
AIC 747.6124 743.7481 742.6296 749.3961 729.8975 727.1605 725.8846 731.2280 
BIC 809.3839 805.5196 804.4010 811.1676 797.7524 795.0154 793.7395 799.0829 
Standard errors in parentheses * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
1) The weighting matrix for Related Emissions (W*GHG, W*AC; W*PM10; W*OzTr)  has been built with a cutoff at the 75th percentile 
2) The weighting matrix for Related Energy (W*ENERGY) has been built with a cutoff at the 75th percentile 
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Table 9 - Econometric Results (III) Principal Component Analysis  
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
      
      
F1_DIRECT -0.3802** -0.4273** -0.4012** -0.3898** -0.4069** 
 (0.1679) (0.1679) (0.1743) (0.1645) (0.1664) 
F2_RELATED 0.6234** 0.7083*** 0.7820*** 0.6431*** 0.7841*** 
 (0.2446) (0.2438) (0.2892) (0.2119) (0.2402) 
ENERGY   -11.1750  -15.5135 
   (46.2253)  (76.7143) 
W*ENERGY   2.9506  11.9643 
   (33.6447)  (82.6422) 
VA 0.5857*** 0.6746*** 0.5454*** 0.5401*** 0.4915*** 
 (0.2076) (0.2090) (0.2035) (0.1736) (0.1753) 
PURD 0.6254 0.6838* 0.6851* 0.6202 0.6364* 
 (0.3894) (0.3883) (0.4000) (0.3807) (0.3812) 
DENSITY 0.0527 0.3223 0.0326 -0.0172 0.0273 
 (0.6010) (0.5897) (0.5889) (0.5799) (0.5629) 
DIRTY 0.3293 0.5253 0.2077 0.3993 0.2899 
 (0.4379) (0.4460) (0.4468) (0.4314) (0.4303) 
POL -3.1558 -1.2427 -2.8519 -3.9019 -3.8408 
 (4.2167) (4.3004) (4.2006) (4.1719) (4.1403) 
EXPORT_UE 0.5410 0.7058 0.6731 0.5493 0.6628 
 (0.4435) (0.4596) (0.4627) (0.4401) (0.4503) 
NORTHWEST 0.6914 0.7148 0.7578 0.8340 0.8609 
 (0.5390) (0.5517) (0.5411) (0.5371) (0.5290) 
NORTHEAST -0.2259 -0.6621 -0.1959 -0.1042 -0.0676 
 (0.4423) (0.5308) (0.4414) (0.4412) (0.4383) 
SOUTH -0.7888 -1.1009 -0.9013 -0.8409 -0.9653 
 (0.6379) (0.6698) (0.6386) (0.6257) (0.6201) 
METRO  -0.6906    
  (0.4211)    
_cons -3.9349* -4.5023** -4.0007* -3.8529* -3.7731* 
 (2.1405) (2.1513) (2.1029) (1.9759) (1.9516) 
inflate      
patid -0.1109*** -0.1042*** -0.0953*** -0.1065*** -0.0896*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0320) (0.0310) (0.0380) (0.0278) 
_cons 1.9345*** 1.9260*** 1.7036*** 1.8911*** 1.6546*** 
 (0.2548) (0.2468) (0.2632) (0.2541) (0.2600) 
lnalpha      
_cons 0.1177 0.0422 0.0807 0.0823 0.0288 
 (0.2860) (0.2692) (0.2613) (0.2833) (0.2582) 
N 454 454 400 454 400 
Log-Likelihood -358.869 -357.546 -348.190 -357.195 -346.398 
Pr>LR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Likelihood-ratio test α=0 (Chi²) 508.03 491.65 501.10 499.74 492.56 
Pr>Chi² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Vuong Test (z) 4.80 4.85 4.47 4.84 4.55 
Pr> z 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mc Fadden’sR2 0.206 0.209 0.203 0.209 0.207 
AIC 747.7379 747.0929 730.3808 744.3900 726.7964 
BIC 809.5094 812.9825 798.2357 806.1614 794.6513 
Standard errors in parentheses * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
1) The weighting matrix for Related Emissions (W*GHG, W*AC; W*PM10; W*OzTr)  has 
been built with a cutoff at the 75th percentile in column (IV) and (V) and without any cutoff 
in coulmn (I) to (III) 
2) The weighting matrix for Related Energy (W*ENERGY) has been built with a cutoff at the 
75th percentile column (VI) and without any cutoff in coulmn (IV) 
3) F1_DIRECT is the linear combination of the different classes of air emissions yield by 
applying principal component analysis 
4) F2_ RELATED is the linear combination of the different classes of air emissions from 
vertically related sectors yield by applying principal component analysis 
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ANNEXES 
Table A1 - Econometric Results (V) Poisson and Negative Binomial regression 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
         
GT         
GHG -0.0900    -0.4616    
 (0.3287)    (0.4436)    
         
W*GHG 1.3491***    1.6826***    
 (0.3875)    (0.4437)    
         
PM10  -1.8214**    -1.7559**   
  (0.7247)    (0.7824)   
         
W*PM10  1.5883***    2.0148**   
  (0.5323)    (0.7944)   
         
OzTr   0.0239    -0.3251  
   (0.2759)    (0.3525)  
         
W*OzTr   1.3616***    1.7994***  
   (0.4485)    (0.4265)  
         
AC    -2.2413**    -2.6652* 
    (1.1378)    (1.4938) 
         
W*AC    1.3490*    2.7192** 
    (0.7757)    (1.3250) 
         
VA 0.9994*** 0.7663*** 1.2643*** 0.6523*** 0.9751*** 0.7123*** 1.3124*** 0.6403*** 
 (0.1995) (0.1975) (0.2369) (0.1986) (0.2170) (0.2216) (0.2710) (0.2044) 
         
PURD 0.6126 0.5690 0.6798 0.5400 1.0785*** 1.1375*** 1.0687*** 1.1044*** 
 (0.4063) (0.3632) (0.4351) (0.3566) (0.4093) (0.4133) (0.4024) (0.4215) 
         
DENSITY -0.2881 -0.0290 -0.6787 0.1200 0.5135 1.0725 0.0058 1.1604 
 (0.7474) (0.7050) (0.8114) (0.7227) (0.7019) (0.6964) (0.7447) (0.7126) 
         
DIRTY -0.3705 0.1268 -0.5882 0.0625 0.2257 0.4581 -0.1094 0.4812 
 (0.5095) (0.4377) (0.4724) (0.4635) (0.5591) (0.4649) (0.5094) (0.5117) 
         
POL -5.8767 -6.6079 -6.6268 -6.5536 -0.4526 1.8802 -1.5947 1.6881 
 (6.0241) (5.8091) (6.2293) (5.6637) (4.4439) (4.4524) (4.4801) (4.7039) 
         
EXPORT_UE 0.5192 0.5415 0.3889 0.5614 1.4046** 1.4321** 1.3082** 1.4142** 
 (0.5525) (0.5386) (0.5441) (0.5295) (0.5754) (0.5583) (0.5769) (0.5661) 
         
NORTHWEST 1.4031* 1.3655* 1.6638** 1.3152** 1.1363** 0.9487* 1.2696** 0.9599* 
 (0.7667) (0.6969) (0.8432) (0.6663) (0.5475) (0.5633) (0.5418) (0.5795) 
         
NORTHEAST 0.3398 0.3292 0.5237 0.2871 -0.1681 -0.2499 -0.1578 -0.2834 
 (0.6413) (0.6218) (0.6620) (0.6077) (0.5431) (0.5398) (0.5480) (0.5477) 
         
SOUTH -0.9719 -0.8717 -0.9729 -0.8560 -1.0881* -1.1215* -1.1919** -1.0170* 
 (0.6479) (0.5778) (0.7022) (0.5644) (0.5806) (0.5832) (0.5821) (0.5809) 
_cons -9.6938*** -7.1787** -12.7023*** -6.0527** -11.5838*** -8.2176*** -15.6544*** -7.4037*** 
 (3.0106) (2.9686) (3.3939) (2.8701) (2.6016) (2.4526) (3.2125) (2.3673) 
lnalpha         
_cons     1.9639*** 1.9932*** 1.9344*** 2.0239*** 
     (0.1536) (0.1545) (0.1542) (0.1545) 
N 454 454 454 454 454 454 454 454 
Log-Likelihood -1072.175 -1080.726 -1050.894 -1105.112 -402.429 -405.393 -400.564 -407.060 
Pr>LR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Likelihood-ratio test 
α=0 (Chi²) 
- - - - 1339.49 1350.67 1300.66 1396.11 
Pr>Chi² - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mc Fadden’sR2 0.422 0.418 0.434 0.404 0.110 0.104 0.114 0.100 
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AIC 2168.3509 2185.4519 2125.7887 2234.2246 830.8572 836.7855 827.1286 840.1190 
BIC 2217.7680 2234.8691 2175.2059 2283.6418 884.3924 890.3208 880.6638 893.6543 
Standard errors in parentheses * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
3) Results in column (I) to (IV) applied a Poisson regression estimation  
4) Results in column (V) to (VIII) applied a Negative Binomial regression estimation  
Table A2 – Sectoral Classification 
 
Sector  
NACE REV 1.1 
Description 
A Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
B Fishing 
C Mining and quarrying 
DA Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products 
DD, DH, DN Manufacture of wood and wood products; Manufacture of rubber and plastic products; Other manufacture 
DE Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing 
DF, DG 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-
made fibres 
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 
DK, DL, DM 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.; Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment; Manufacture of 
transport equipment 
E Electricity, gas and water supply 
F Construction 
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods 
H Hotels and restaurants 
I Transport, storage and communication 
J Financial intermediation 
K Real estate, renting and business activities 
L Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
M Education 
N Health and social work 
O Other community, social and personal service activities 
P Activities of households 
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Table A3 – WIPO IPC Green Inventory 
 
TOPIC IPC  
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY PRODUCTION 
Bio-fuels   
Solid fuels C10L 5/00, 5/40-
5/48 
Torrefaction of biomass C10B 53/02 
C10L 5/40, 9/00 
Liquid fuels C10L 1/00, 1/02, 
1/14 
Vegetable oils C10L 1/02, 1/19 
Biodiesel C07C 67/00, 69/00 
  C10G 
  C10L 1/02, 1/19 
  C11C 3/10 
  C12P 7/64 
Bioethanol C10L 1/02, 1/182 
  C12N 9/24 
  C12P 7/06-7/14 
Biogas C02F 3/28, 11/04 
  C10L 3/00 
  C12M 1/107 
  C12P 5/02 
From genetically engineered organisms C12N 1/13, 1/15, 
1/21, 5/10, 15/00 
  A01H 
Integrated gasification combined cycle 
(IGCC) 
C10L 3/00 
  F02C 3/28 
Fuelcells H01M 4/86-4/98, 
8/00-8/24, 12/00-
12/08 
Electrodes H01M 4/86-4/98 
Inert electrodes with catalytic activity H01M 4/86-4/98 
Non-activeparts H01M 2/00-2/04 , 
8/00-8/24  
Within hybridcells H01M 12/00-
12/08 
Pyrolysis or gasification of biomass   
  C10B 53/00 
  C10J 
Harnessing energy from manmade waste   
Agricultural waste C10L 5/00 
Fuel from animal waste and crop residues C10L 5/42, 5/44 
Incinerators for field, garden or wood waste F23G 7/00, 7/10 
Gasification C10J 3/02, 3/46 
  F23B 90/00 
  F23G 5/027 
TOPIC IPC  
Chemicalwaste B09B 3/00 
  F23G 7/00 
Industrial waste C10L 5/48 
F23G 5/00, 7/00 
Using top gas in blast furnaces to power pig-
iron production 
C21B 5/06 
Pulp liquors D21C 11/00 
Anaerobic digestion of industrial waste A62D 3/02 
  C02F 11/04, 11/14 
Industrial wood waste F23G 7/00, 7/10 
Hospital waste B09B 3/00 
  F23G 5/00 
Landfill gas B09B 
Separation of components B01D 53/02, 
53/04, 53/047, 
53/14, 53/22, 
53/24 
Municipal waste C10L 5/46 
  F23G 5/00 
Hydroenergy   
Water-power plants E02B 9/00-9/06 
Tide or wave power plants E02B 9/08 
Machines or engines for liquids F03B 
  F03C 
Using wave or tide energy F03B 13/12-13/26 
Regulating, controlling or safety means of 
machines or engines 
F03B 15/00-15/22 
Propulsion of marine vessels using energy 
derived from water movement 
B63H 19/02, 19/04 
Ocean thermal energy conversion 
(OTEC) 
F03G 7/05 
Wind energy F03D 
Structural association of electric generator 
with mechanical driving motor 
H02K 7/18 
Structural aspects of wind turbines B63B 35/00 
  E04H 12/00 
  F03D 11/04 
Propulsion of vehicles using wind power B60K 16/00 
Electric propulsion of vehicles using wind 
power 
B60L 8/00 
Propulsion of marine vessels by wind-
powered motors 
B63H 13/00 
Solar energy   
Photovoltaics (PV)   
Devices adapted for the conversion of 
radiation energy into electrical energy 
H01L 27/142, 
31/00-31/078 
  H01G 9/20 
  H02N 6/00 
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TOPIC IPC  
Using organic materials as the active part H01L 27/30, 
51/42-51/48 
Assemblies of a plurality of solar cells H01L 25/00, 
25/03, 25/16, 
25/18, 31/042 
Silicon; single-crystal growth C01B 33/02 
  C23C 14/14, 16/24 
  C30B 29/06 
Regulating to the maximum power available 
from solar cells 
G05F 1/67 
Electric lighting devices with, or 
rechargeable with, solar cells 
F21L 4/00 
  F21S 9/03 
Charging batteries H02J 7/35 
Dye-sensitised solar cells (DSSC) H01G 9/20 
  H01M 14/00 
Use of solar heat F24J 2/00-2/54 
For domestic hot water systems F24D 17/00 
For space heating F24D 3/00, 5/00, 
11/00, 19/00 
For swimming pools F24J 2/42 
Solar updraft towers F03D 1/04, 9/00, 
11/04 
  F03G 6/00 
For treatment of water, waste water or 
sludge 
C02F 1/14 
Gas turbine power plants using solar heat 
source 
F02C 1/05 
Hybrid solar thermal-PV systems H01L 31/058 
Propulsion of vehicles using solar power B60K 16/00 
Electric propulsion of vehicles using solar 
power 
B60L 8/00 
Producing mechanical power from solar 
energy 
F03G 6/00-6/06 
Roof covering aspects of energy collecting 
devices 
E04D 13/00, 13/18 
Steam generation using solar heat F22B 1/00 
  F24J 1/00 
Refrigeration or heat pump systems using 
solar energy 
F25B 27/00 
Use of solar energy for drying materials or 
objects 
F26B 3/00, 3/28 
Solar concentrators F24J 2/06 
  G02B 7/183 
Solar ponds F24J 2/04 
Geothermal energy   
Use of geothermal heat F01K 
  F24F 5/00 
  F24J 3/08 
  H02N 10/00 
  F25B 30/06 
Production of mechanical power from 
geothermal energy 
F03G 4/00-4/06, 
7/04 
TOPIC IPC  
Other production or use of heat, not 
derived from combustion, e.g. natural 
heat 
F24J 1/00, 3/00, 
3/06 
Heat pumps in central heating systems using 
heat accumulated in storage masses 
F24D 11/02 
Heat pumps in other domestic- or space-
heating systems 
F24D 15/04 
Heat pumps in domestic hot-water supply 
systems 
F24D 17/02 
Air or water heaters using heat pumps F24H 4/00 
Heat pumps F25B 30/00 
Using waste heat   
To produce mechanical energy F01K 27/00 
Of combustion engines F01K 23/06-23/10 
  F01N 5/00 
  F02G 5/00-5/04 
  F25B 27/02 
Of steam engine plants F01K 17/00, 23/04 
Of gas-turbine plants F02C 6/18 
As source of energy for refrigeration plants F25B 27/02 
For treatment of water, waste water or 
sewage 
C02F 1/16 
Recovery of waste heat in paper production D21F 5/20 
For steam generation by exploitation of the 
heat content of hot heat carriers 
F22B 1/02 
Recuperation of heat energy from waste 
incineration 
F23G 5/46 
Energy recovery in air conditioning F24F 12/00 
Arrangements for using waste heat from 
furnaces, kilns, ovens or retorts 
F27D 17/00 
Regenerative heat-exchange apparatus F28D 17/00-20/00 
Of gasification plants C10J 3/86 
Devices for producing mechanical power 
from muscle energy 
F03G 5/00-5/08 
TRANSPORTATION 
  
Vehicles in general   
Hybrid vehicles, e.g Hybrid Electric 
Vehicles (HEVs) 
B60K 6/00, 6/20 
Control systems B60W 20/00 
Gearingstherefor F16H 3/00-3/78, 
48/00-48/30 
Brushless motors H02K 29/08 
Electromagnetic clutches H02K 49/10 
Regenerative braking systems B60L 7/10-7/22 
Electric propulsion with power supply 
from force of nature, e.g.  sun, wind 
B60L 8/00 
Electric propulsion with power supply 
external to vehicle 
B60L 9/00 
With power supply from fuel cells, e.g 
for hydrogen vehicles 
B60L 11/18 
Combustion engines operating on 
gaseous fuels, e.g hydrogen 
F02B 43/00 
  F02M 21/02, 27/02 
Power supply from force of nature, 
e.g. sun, wind 
B60K 16/00 
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TOPIC IPC  
Charging stations for electric vehicles H02J 7/00 
Vehicles other than rail vehicles   
Drag reduction   
  B62D 35/00, 35/02 
  B63B 1/34-1/40 
Human-powered vehicle B62K 
  B62M 1/00, 3/00, 5/00, 
6/00 
Rail vehicles B61 
Drag reduction B61D 17/02 
Marine vessel propulsion   
Propulsive devices directly acted on by 
wind 
B63H 9/00 
Propulsion by wind-powered motors B63H 13/00 
Propulsion using energy derived from 
water movement 
B63H 19/02, 19/04 
Propulsion by muscle power B63H 16/00 
Propulsion derived from nuclear energy B63H 21/18 
Cosmonautic vehicles using solar 
energy 
B64G 1/44 
ENERGY CONSERVATION 
  
Storage of electrical energy B60K 6/28 
  B60W 10/26 
  H01M 10/44-10/46 
  H01G 9/155 
  H02J 3/28, 7/00, 15/00 
Power supply circuitry H02J 
With power saving modes H02J 9/00 
Measurement of electricity 
consumption 
B60L 3/00 
  G01R 
Storage of thermal energy C09K 5/00 
  F24H 7/00 
  F28D 20/00, 20/02 
Low energy lighting   
Electroluminescent light sources (e.g. 
LEDs, OLEDs, PLEDs) 
F21K 99/00 
  F21L 4/02 
  H01L 33/00-33/64, 
51/50 
  H05B 33/00 
Thermal building insulation, in 
general 
E04B 1/62, 1/74-1/80, 
1/88, 1/90 
Insulating building elements E04C 1/40, 1/41, 
2/284-2/296 
For door or window openings E06B 3/263 
For walls E04B 2/00 
  E04F 13/08 
For floors E04B 5/00 
TOPIC IPC  
  E04F 15/18 
For roofs E04B 7/00 
  E04D 1/28, 3/35, 13/16 
For ceilings E04B 9/00 
  E04F 13/08 
Recovering mechanical energy F03G 7/08 
Chargeable mechanical accumulators in 
vehicles 
B60K 6/10, 6/30 
  B60L 11/16 
WASTE MANAGEMENT 
  
Waste disposal B09B 
  B65F 
Treatment of waste   
Disinfection or sterilisation A61L 11/00 
Treatment of hazardous or toxic waste A62D 3/00, 101/00 
Treating radioactively contaminated 
material; decontamination arrangements 
therefor 
G21F 9/00 
Refuse separation B03B 9/06 
Reclamation of contaminated soil B09C 
Mechanical treatment of waste paper D21B 1/08, 1/32 
Consuming waste by combustion F23G 
Reuse of waste materials   
Use of rubber waste in footwear A43B 1/12, 21/14 
Manufacture of articles from waste 
metal particles 
B22F 8/00 
Production of hydraulic cements from 
waste materials 
C04B 7/24-7/30 
Use of waste materials as fillers for 
mortars, concrete 
C04B 18/04-18/10 
Production of fertilisers from waste or 
refuse 
C05F 
Recovery or working-up of waste 
materials 
C08J 11/00-11/28 
  C09K 11/01 
  C11B 11/00, 13/00-
13/04 
  C14C 3/32 
  C21B 3/04 
  C25C 1/00 
  D01F 13/00-13/04 
Pollution control   
Carbon capture and storage B01D 53/14, 53/22, 
53/62 
  B65G 5/00 
  C01B 31/20 
  E21B 41/00, 43/16 
  E21F 17/16 
  F25J 3/02 
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TOPIC IPC  
Air quality management   
Treatment of waste gases B01D 53/00-53/96 
Exhaust apparatus for combustion 
engines with means for treating exhaust 
F01N 3/00-3/38 
Rendering exhaust gases innocuous B01D 53/92 
  F02B 75/10 
Removal of waste gases or dust in steel 
production 
C21C 5/38 
Combustion apparatus using 
recirculation of flue gases 
C10B 21/18 
  F23B 80/02 
  F23C 9/00 
Combustion of waste gases or noxious 
gases 
F23G 7/06 
Electrical control of exhaust gas treating 
apparatus 
F01N 9/00 
Separating dispersed particles from 
gases or vapours 
B01D 45/00-51/00 
  B03C 3/00 
Dust removal from furnaces C21B 7/22 
  C21C 5/38 
  F27B 1/18 
  F27B 15/12 
Use of additives in fuels or fires to 
reduce smoke or facilitate soot removal 
C10L 10/02, 10/06 
  F23J 7/00 
Arrangements of devices for treating 
smoke or fumes from combustion 
apparatus 
F23J 15/00 
Dust-laying or dust-absorbing materials C09K 3/22 
Pollution alarms G08B 21/12 
Control of water pollution   
    
Treating waste-water or sewage B63J 4/00 
  C02F 
To produce fertilisers C05F 7/00 
Materials for treating liquid pollutants C09K 3/32 
Removing pollutants from open water B63B 35/32 
  E02B 15/04 
Plumbing installations for waste water E03C 1/12 
Management of sewage C02F 1/00, 3/00, 9/00 
  E03F 
Means for preventing radioactive 
contamination in the event of reactor 
leakage 
G21C 13/10 
AGRICULTURE / FORESTRY 
  
Forestry techniques A01G 23/00 
Alternative irrigation techniques A01G 25/00 
Pesticide alternatives A01N 25/00-65/00 
Soil improvement C09K 17/00 
TOPIC IPC  
  E02D 3/00 
Organic fertilisers derived from waste C05F 
ADMINISTRATIVE, REGULATORY OR DESIGN 
ASPECTS 
  
Commuting, e.g., HOV, teleworking, 
etc. 
G06Q 
  G08G 
Carbon/emissions trading, e.g 
pollution credits 
G06Q 
Static structure design  E04H 1/00 
 
 
 
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION 
  
Nuclear engineering G21 
Fusion reactors G21B 
Nuclear (fission) reactors G21C 
Nuclear power plant G21D 
Gas turbine power plants using heat 
source of nuclear origin 
F02C 1/05 
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